The future of Boscombe Down Military Airfield

Introduction
Strategically located in central southern England, Boscombe Down has been in continuous use as a military airfield for over sixty years and has played a vital role in the testing and development of aircraft for the UK's armed forces throughout that period. The establishment is now owned by the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency and the airfield is host to a number of DERA and Royal Air Force service units including the Aircraft Test and Evaluations Sector, the Empire Test Pilots' School, the Strike/Attack Operation Evaluation Unit and the Southampton University Air Squadron.

Boscombe Down is a major local employer so is of fundamental importance to the local economy of Amesbury and the surrounding communities in South Wiltshire.

Before Boscombe Down was owned and run by the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency, it was funded directly from the Ministry of Defence budget. It was known as the Aircraft and Armament Experimental Establishment. By common consent it was over-manned, under-worked, over-funded and inefficient. Each April it received a large sum of money on which to survive the following twelve months irrespective of whether it really needed it. At the beginning of each calendar year, the Establishment Head would do his best to ensure that his budget was not under-spent by the beginning of the financial year (March 31st) which might result in his budget being cut for the following year. New lampposts, curb stones, resurfaced roads, new office furniture and computers would all appear in order to reduce the under-spend.

Since the previous Government created DERA, Boscombe Down has had to become accountable, reduce waste, employ realistic numbers of people, produce sound and timely advice and generally improve the product offered to their customers. The MOD establishments at Bedford and Farnborough all came together to form DERA and the old A&AEE became the Defence Test and Evaluation Organisation. Eventually, Bedford and Farnborough were closed and the aircraft and personnel transferred to Boscombe Down. Aircraft and manpower levels were reduced to a minimum. The new establishment was known as DERA, Aircraft Testing and Evaluation (AT&E) Boscombe Down. Now DERA Boscombe Down is efficiently managed, financially accountable and offers real value to the taxpayer, as well as delivering high quality work on time to its customers.

Following the end of the Cold War and in line with all our NATO allies, our defence budget shrank and further efficiencies were necessary. New accounting procedures meant that Boscombe Down carried an increasingly heavy burden of overhead costs related to the size of the establishment and the former functions it had carried out. Increasingly it has become clear that these overheads must be reduced. Existing functions have become more efficient, but new work is essential. This has been clear for several years. From a range of possible options, Boscombe Down Airfield (BDN) decided to bid for the Ministry of Defence's Defence Procurement Agency project to provide the Royal Air Force with a new air-to-air refuelling capability and the associated secondary air transport. Thus, in the spring of 1999, BDN launched its bid to provide the main operating base package for whichever private sector consortium wins the private finance initiative competition for the Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft (FSTA). This was widely publicised in the local South Wiltshire press and media in spring 1999.

It is clear from the initial Boscombe Down bid document, "A Competitive Edge for FSTA", that Boscombe Down is seeking to provide an operating base rather than the provision of aircraft. The original BDN partners were DERA, Rotch Property Group Limited, J Henry Shroder and Co Ltd, PACE Group International Ltd (project design and management consultants), COMAX (secure business support services) and Tilbury Douglas (building and civil engineering contractors).

BDN confidently expected that the main operating consortia would turn to BDN as operating base. However, in my judgement, there was always confusion about exactly what would be involved. As ever the specification changed. There was doubt about the extent to which the RAF would be directly involved. In the original document it is fair to say that BDN identified a combined road/rail terminal and freight storage location on-site, reinstatement of the original railway line planned for Boscombe Down and bulk supply of fuel via rail or pipeline options. BDN also talked of a passenger terminal, customs, overnight accommodation and medical facilities, and they also spoke of "the solution, in partnership with the MOD, to issues associated with the future of Brize Norton and its redevelopment for military or civil use together with the re-location of service units as necessary".

In the Interim User Requirement Document produced by the Defence Procurement Agency, examples of services which could be included under the FSTA contract are the provision of aircraft, spares, support equipment and management of Government equipment; the training of flight crews and other FSTA personnel; engineering and logistic support; passenger, freight handling and associated services; fleet management; maintenance and management of the existing fleet; and the disposal of surplus existing assets and disposal of surplus assets and property at the end of the service contract period, which was to run for 25 years from 2007. In addition, potential suppliers may also consider assuming responsibility for the management of the current main operating base (Brize Norton), providing an alternative main operating base or using the existing main operating base facilities and support services under MOD control.

This was all outlined in the Invitation to Submit Outline Proposals (ISOP) in September 1999. In November 1999, four consortia submitted replies to the ISOP. They are:

1. The Rolls Royce-led consortium known as Air Reach
2. The British Aerospace consortium
3. Strategic Support Management, led by SERCO Defence
4. Eurotanker Limited, led by FR Aviation of Bournemouth International Airport.

Confusion
If the BDN bid was to be successful, then all four of the prime contractors should have been fully engaged with Boscombe Down from the outset. This did not happen.

One major prime told me on 21st November that at that date he was unaware that Boscombe Down was involved at all. There had been no discussion of Boscombe Down at any stage to date, right up to four star (military General) level.

Another prime told me that there had never been any intention of going anywhere other than Brize Norton. Their consortium had never considered it seriously, but they did evaluate it and found it not to be a reasonable operating base. They were put off by the lack of a pipeline and poor communications. Nor was Boscombe Down attractive as a flying operations base. (This point was also underlined by an ex-Navy pilot who is currently a commercial pilot who points out that BDN is on top of a 400 ft hill and the prevailing weather means that, while the cloudbase at Bournemouth is 200 ft above the ground, at Boscombe it is 200 ft up in the clouds; this is an unattractive option even with automatic takeoff and landing technology.)

A third prime said his consortium had looked at BDN early on and rejected it. They were convinced that there was a huge planning risk with the local authorities. Nor was there a strong business case.

The fourth consortium said they had done their duty but not seriously considered BDN. They said they would have considered BDN if the MOD's Defence Procurement Agency had recommended it. However, it was their understanding that the RAF had refused point blank to see Brize Norton closed. At an early stage in the process they had also looked at airfields such as Huntingdon and Manston, but concluded none of them were as good as Brize Norton.

There was a general consensus that by now the primes fully expected someone would have told Boscombe Down to stop their bid. That was a point echoed by some people in DERA itself who told me they would have expected many months ago to have been taken off the case.

One contractor told me that they had thought of bringing Boscombe Down into their consortium two years ago - but DERA had told them that BDN must be offered to all the bidders so this particular bidder lost interest.

The prime contractors also told me that the FSTA requirement had been changed continuously by the Ministry of Defence. The requirement had oscillated between provision of an FSTA base to taking over the whole of Brize Norton. (This was also scuppered by the Royal Air Force.) At one stage the Defence Procurement Agency had given the impression the primes could just pick and mix the assets they needed. They said that what had started as a large-scale contractorisation programme had turned back to an equipment programme by mid-2000.

Planning notification to Salisbury District Council
In September 2000, DERA Boscombe Down notified the local planning authority (Salisbury District Council) of their development proposals. The normal democratic process was triggered. SDC sent copies of the non-technical summaries to local parishes. The seven-volume Environmental Appraisal and supporting documentation was made available for public inspection at District Council offices. District Council planners briefed interested parish councils at the end of September.

Objection very quickly focused on noise, airborne tanker safety, road transport considerations and the scale of the developments proposed, including new housing and support services. All of those issues must be addressed in the course of the planning process which has now begun. I would like to take a step back to look at the strategic issues at this point.

Is the Boscombe Down Bid Likely to Succeed?
No one should be in any doubt that DERA Boscombe Down's bid is entirely genuine. They desperately need this project. Their survival may depend upon it. An enormous amount of time, effort and money has gone into the bid - Ministers confirmed to me that DERA has spent £175,000 so far. No expense has been spared and consultants have worked hard alongside the management of BDN.

Given that all four prime contractors had dismissed the Boscombe Down operating base concept early on and given that the RAF is so clearly opposed to leaving Brize Norton, why has the Ministry of Defence insisted that the BDN bid continues?

It is clear to me that DERA gave Ministers every opportunity to say that the BDN bid would not succeed and should therefore be dropped. I believe the Defence Procurement Agency insisted that the BDN bid should continue and that the RAF reluctantly, and against their better judgement, agreed. I believe the Defence Procurement Minister and her colleagues were fully aware that the BDN bid would fail and that in the process a great deal of local goodwill in South Wiltshire would be lost. I believe this was reckless. It represented a cynical manipulation of a very loyal and highly skilled workforce. It also put at risk relations with a hugely supportive civilian community who put up not only with test pilot fast jets, testing and evaluation and helicopters, but also army activity on the Salisbury Plain Training Area.

I believe it was also put to DERA top management and the Defence Procurement Agency that of all the possible ways forward for BDN, the FSTA project was likely to be the most controversial and the least likely to succeed. It was not the right one with which to kick off.

What are those alternatives? DERA might offer increased test pilot or other fast jet training, a major helicopter base, mixed civilian use for executive jets (which already use BDN on an ad hoc basis) or various other developments which might or might not involve the Ministry of Defence.

Privatisation of DERA Boscombe Down
A complicating factor has been the dithering and delay in Ministers deciding whether or not to include Boscombe Down in their privatisation of three quarters of DERA. Whilst it was announced in summer 2000 that DERA CBD Porton Down would be retained in the public sector, and other parts of DERA could easily be identified as moving to the private sector, no decision has yet been announced on the status of Boscombe Down.

In anticipation of a ministerial announcement, DERA has decided to act as two separate organisations from 1st January 2001. From that date they will be operating as Shadow Trading Companies, Shadow Operations and so on. From 1st April, DERA expects to become a wholly-owned Government company. It will be a "plc". All the current employees of DERA will cease to be civil servants from 1st April 2001. DERA is keen not to be bought as a going concern by a prime contractor, such as BAe Systems (or a consortium of primes) and nor does it want to raise all its money from venture capital companies in the City of London. DERA proposes to go to the market via the IPO (Initial Purchase Offer) route thus attracting the maximum number of shareholders and thereby, in theory, retaining more control over their own affairs. Personally I believe that route would lead to very fast purchase of shares and concentration of ownership into a few hands unless specifically forbidden in the terms of the flotation.

Amidst all this uncertainty there has been some speculation, maybe cynical, that the dead hand of the Treasury is behind all this. It is surmised that the Government hopes that by seeking agreement of the local planning authority to this massive development, whether or not they win the FSTA bid, they will have, at a stroke, enhanced their credibility with private sector purchasers in the market. A site with planning permission is more valuable than a site without it!

Linked to those suspicions is the whole question of the way in which DERA set about achieving planning permission.

Planning Issues
When the United Kingdom ceased to be an absolute monarchy and Parliament wrestled the power of the monarchy into the hands of the government of the day, we established a principle that the government is entitled to act either under Statute Law agreed by Parliament or under powers derived directly from the Crown in Parliament. Constitutionally this is known as the Royal Prerogative. For example, the British Government can sign international treaties and even go to war without any discussion or vote in Parliament. Similarly, acting in the national interest, there are circumstances in which the government may grant itself Crown Immunity from Statute Law. This has been shrinking substantially in recent years. However, it still operates, in the national interest, so that the Ministry of Defence can give itself planning permission. This procedure was last reviewed in 1984 and was published in the Department of the Environment's 18th Circular of that year. Hence this method of obtaining planning permission, bypassing the normal planning procedures of the local planning authority, is known as the "18/84 Procedure". Rather than applying for planning permission, the Government notifies the planning authority of its intention to develop its property.

There are circumstances and occasions when the 18/84 Procedure makes good sense and I can support it. On other occasions, it is a matter of judgement whether in fact it would be better to go through the statutory procedures.

In this case, DERA notified Salisbury District Council under the 18/84 Procedure that they proposed to develop Boscombe Down. They gave SDC all the right initial information as if it was a normal planning application, whilst knowing that it was no such thing. If Salisbury District Council decides not to object, that is the end of the matter. If, on the other hand, the District Council does object, then three things can happen. The Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions can take note of the objection, but approve the application in any case using his powers as Secretary of State. Secondly, he could demand a hearing in private and then make his decision. Thirdly, he could call a public enquiry into the matter before deciding. I happen to think that in this case, if the District Council objects, it will go to John Prescott and he is likely to insist on a public enquiry. All of this could not only take just as a long as a normal planning application, it would also inflame local opinion and slow down the whole procedure.

So the first planning question is, why on earth did DERA decide to do it this way?

At this stage I am prepared to speculate that given the very, very small possibility of the FSTA project succeeding, and given that DERA knows that it was in the words of one of their officials "crass to use the 18/84 Procedure", I believe DERA would wish to withdraw their application in the interests of re-grouping for more acceptable projects. I suspect there are those who would now like to go on a charm offensive locally and I have a hunch that if our Salisbury District Councillors object to the planning notification, then DERA will not pursue it. To put it another way, I think DERA are looking for a lifeline and would welcome a way out of the FSTA process.

Enter Sting.
It will not be as simple as that! Aggrieved and public-spirited residents of the Woodford Valley have joined together to contest the FSTA proposal in the High Court. They are seeking a Judicial Review on the grounds that their human rights have been breached because the Government is both the landowner and the decision maker on the planning application.

It is an irony that the Government, in seeking to boost the human rights of our citizens, incorporated the European Convention on Human Rights into British Statute Law in 1998, thus making it much easier for citizens to take cases to Court in this country, and that an early casualty will be a Government Department! The applicants to the High Court contend that the 18/84 Procedure being followed by DERA breaches Article 6 of the European Convention because the Government acts as one unified corporate body and that therefore in deciding the application from the Secretary of State for Defence, the Secretary of State for the Environment cannot conceivably be regarded as either independent or impartial.

If this application for Judicial Review succeeds, the first practical consequence will be that the Boscombe Down FSTA project could be put on hold for a matter of years while the case grinds through the courts. If they go ahead with the construction project, they could end up having to rip it all down again.

There are two more important consequences. First, the whole principle of Crown Immunity could be ended. That would have enormous implications for the government of this country. The second consequence is that the whole constitutional issue of the use of the Royal Prerogative could be thrown into question - an issue long pursued by Tony Benn MP and others.

The result of the application for Judicial Review should be known before Christmas.

Brize Norton
On 28th November I visited RAF Brize Norton. I am very grateful to Defence Ministers and to the Station Commander for agreeing to this in-depth briefing. Of course, I have visited RAF Brize Norton before, both when I was a Member of the Defence Select Committee and as a Shadow Defence Minister. This briefing was specifically about the current role of RAF Brize Norton and about the FSTA Project.

Those present to brief me included the Officer Commanding the Operations Wing, the Future Projects Officer, the senior FSTA Project Officer from the Defence Procurement Agency, the Chief Planning Officer from HQ Strike Command, the Officer Commanding the RAF Tactical Communications Wing, the Officer Commanding the RAF Joint Air Transport Evaluation Unit, the Officer Commanding the RAF Technical Supply Squadron and the Officer Commanding the RAF's Number 1 Parachute Training School.

RAF Brize Norton comprises 3,500 service personnel and 600 civilians. Their annual budget is over £800 million. They handle 15,000 tonnes of fuel a year, 150,000 passengers, 8,000 tonnes of freight, 6,600 large aircraft movements (one movement includes a takeoff and a landing) and 2,500 civilian aircraft movements. They also have medivac teams. They are licensed to handle weapons and explosives and they also have civil licensing status. The maximum number of aircraft on the ground at any one time is 27, but this is very unusual.

I was told unequivocally that neither Brize Norton, nor the Defence Procurement Agency have encouraged DERA to pursue their Boscombe Down bid.

All the work done by the DPA concludes that the FSTA Project should be based at Brize Norton.

I raised the question of the circuit flight patterns illustrated in the preliminary environmental assessment deposited by DERA with the Salisbury District Council. Those briefing me were surprised this issue had been raised because there was no reason why there should be any circuit flying over Boscombe Down in connection with the FSTA.

The winning Prime Service Provider has not been asked to run Brize Norton or any other airfield as a Main Operating Base, though they may offer to do so. The future tankers would be crewed by Royal Air Force personnel which would include sponsored Reserves. This would be important in providing the flexibility needed to meet the surge in demand for aircraft caused by a sudden increase in military activity.

The preferred aircraft would be the Airbus 330/200 or the Boeing 767.

It would be up to the commercial consortia to suggest the number of aircraft necessary for the job but they would be likely to recommend 20 aircraft, four of which would be permanently on the civil register. There would be a core fleet of between 8 and 10 aircraft and another 8 to 10 would therefore be available for the civil market. There could also be opportunities in providing military tanking functions to other nations, including France, Germany and possibly Australia.

The C130 Hercules and new C130J aircraft will continue to operate out of both Brize Norton and Lyneham. Lyneham will remain the RAF's tactical base and Brize Norton the RAF's strategic base. In order to meet strategic heavy lift requirements the Government will lease 4 Boeing C17 Globemasters, which will be based at Brize Norton. The Air Mounting Centre will continue to be based at South Cerney.

It was confirmed to me that with or without the FSTA Project, Brize Norton will not only continue to exist, but will expand in coming years. There is no question of Brize Norton closing and being sold for commercial development. There had been speculation about this and an initial development value of £500 million had been suggested. This had now been revised down to £50 million.

Over £80 million of major investment is planned at Brize Norton over the next four years. A new Defence Regional Medical Centre will be built along with a new Centre for Military Communications, sports, a new Tactical Wing Headquarters and the C17 Headquarters.

I raised the question of our military need for a new medium tactical lift aircraft to which the Government is committed. It is proposed that this should be the Airbus A400M - a military version of the familiar civil airliners. Initially the RAF considered 13 operating bases for the A440M but this has now come down to 4 - Brize Norton, Fairford, Lyneham and Boscombe Down. Decisions will be taken in conjunction with the Prime Customer - which is HQ Land at Wilton. I got the impression that the RAF favours Lyneham and Brize Norton.

None of the so-called lodger units wishes to leave Brize Norton. Looking ten years ahead, the Parachute Training School might co-locate with RAF Wattisham, closer to the Joint Air Mobile Centre at Colchester. At present, the Parachute Test Team at Boscombe Down employs 7 military personnel and about 20 civilian staff. There was no suggestion that they would leave Boscombe Down.

I was briefed on the existing Brize Norton flight patterns. On normal weekdays there are two flights at night between midnight and 7.00 am, ten or eleven flights during the day and two flights between 6.00 pm and midnight. On Saturdays and Sundays there are fewer than one flight between midnight and 7.00 am, three flights during the day average less than one flight between 6.00 pm and midnight.

I explored the whole question of the supply and demand of aviation fuel. I was told that Boscombe Down could expect 13 additional road tankers per day if its bid was successful. However, it became clear that this method of fuelling aircraft would not be operationally acceptable. I pointed out that the Boscombe Down bid had originally proposed the construction of a railway link, which could be used for fuel, and also the possibility of a pipeline. However, the DERA bid has categorically ruled out a pipeline. It was then explained to me that Brize Norton is the only RAF station which not only has a dedicated pipeline, but also has hydranted distribution to each aircraft stand. This means there is a huge operational advantage in the time taken to refuel an aircraft. Refuelling by tanker would take at least twice as long as from a hydrant (for example it would take up to five petrol tankers to fill a Tri-Star). In the judgement of those briefing me this would make Boscombe Down operationally unacceptable. But the Chief Executive of the Defence Procurement Agency has told me that the Boscombe Down bid would ".need to demonstrate value for money whilst protecting operational capability".

It was also put to me that current environmental pollution control regulations imposed by the Environment Agency required a massive lagoon at Brize Norton to intercept any leaked fuel. Doubt was expressed that these requirements could be met at Boscombe Down.

A couple of weeks ago I was contacted by a Councillor from West Oxfordshire District Council who represents Carterton - the village beside RAF Brize Norton. He briefed me on local opinion at Brize Norton. He told me that not only are local people desperate to keep the tanker operation and the whole of the Brize Norton operation but they are also actively involved in pushing for Brize Norton to be opened up as a regional airport! He and others had met all four consortia, all of whom said that the commercial prospects of operating civil aircraft in addition to military aircraft was essential to the success of the FSTA project. This, of course, has ramifications should the Boscombe Down bid succeed.

The Current MOD Position
On 22nd November, Parliamentary Questions I had tabled to the Secretary of State for Defence were answered by Sir Robert Walmsley, Chief Executive of the Defence Procurement Agency. He confirmed that their core requirement is for an air-to-air refuelling service with some elements of air transport capability. To my surprise, he then said, "It is not for a replacement operating base". He said, "We are aware that DERA is promoting the Boscombe Down Airfield as a potential operating base for FSTA and seeking to act as a commercial partner to the FSTA consortia". "We are aware" is a significant phrase. Boscombe Down are on their own - they are not being forced to do this by either Ministers, nor by the Defence Procurement Agency. This was confirmed to me on my visit to Brize Norton. I had always wondered if the Boscombe Down bid was an MOD Aunt Sally, insisted on by the Treasury under their private finance initiative rules to ensure that there is always a serious commercial alternative considered to an existing way of doing things. This is called a "Public Sector Comparator". Sir Robert then went on to say, "Our work on development of the Public Sector Comparator has concluded that RAF Brize Norton is likely to offer the most cost-effective operating base for the FSTA service. However, I should stress that this is not a final decision: under a PFI Procurement Strategy we are prepared to consider an innovative bid that utilises an alternative base. It would need to demonstrate value for money whilst protecting operational capability".

I had also asked in my questions which of the four industry consortia proposed to operate the project from Brize Norton or Boscombe Down. Sir Robert said in his answer, "In submitting these proposals all of the consortia favoured RAF Brize Norton as the main operating base", and he went on, "It will be for the individual consortia to decide how to frame their proposed solutions". But we already know that none of the prime contractors intend to have anything to do with Boscombe Down.

I have never believed in the conspiracy theory of government. The cock-up theory wins every time. To put it another way, you cannot fool all of the people all of the time. The FSTA project is looking more and more like a serious mess. Accordingly, on 23rd November, I wrote to the Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee of the House of Commons, the Rt Hon David Davis MP, to draw his attention to the FSTA project. I explained the background and I asked him to track the unfurling events. I have no doubt at all that the National Audit Office and the Public Accounts Committee are watching every move made by the Ministry of Defence, the Defence Procurement Agency and DERA itself.

This argument is not about defence capability. The RAF will get their new tanker aircraft one way or another. This is all about the process of good government and the use of taxpayers' money. So it is a matter for the Public Accounts Committee and the National Audit Office and not for the Defence Committee (though I know they are well aware of the problems).

The Future of Boscombe Down
There is no doubt that the Ministry of Defence needs a new tanker fleet to replace its ageing, inefficient and noisy aircraft. There is also no doubt that the Boscombe Down bid is very serious indeed because they know that their future depends on it - or on something else unspecified but which must be sustainable in the long run. I believe DERA has a number of alternative proposals up its sleeve. I have mentioned more test pilot or fast jet flying, the arrival of large numbers of helicopters or the extended civilian use of the airfield alongside the military use. One thing we can now rule out is Treasury pressure to sell Brize Norton as a brown field development site and to move the whole Brize operation to Boscombe Down.

The only other alternative would be for the Ministry of Defence to close down the Boscombe Down and sell it for private development.

I have made enquiries and been advised that the Boscombe Down site would offer tremendous potential for industrial, commercial and housing development. Furthermore, it has been suggested to me that there would be far more jobs provided from such development than could be provided by continuing military use.

Let us step back and consider what is our strategic objective in all this? Of course, it is to ensure the future economic viability of the area and above all maintain the very high employment levels in Amesbury and South Wiltshire. But it is more than that. The economy of South Wiltshire is very broadly based and well balanced. What Boscombe Down offers if a very highly skilled workforce - and I believe that should not be lost. Thus, I believe we must consider any private sector future in terms of the "Salisbury Research Triangle" which is already in the pipeline. I have been advised that that would be a very attractive way forward. If DERA leaves, some of the biggest names in high technology defence companies might well be attracted to our area. It might continue to involve some flying. It might be attractive for them to operate some aircraft - but not necessarily the sort of military aircraft activities which currently take place. Civilian aircraft activity would, I suspect, need to be severely limited and certainly not to build up into anything approaching a regional airport.

We need to start thinking about all of this. We also need to know what the people of Amesbury, Durrington and all the villages affected by these developments really think. Is it just a handful of people fighting for their quality of life and fighting against noise? Is it a broader swathe of people fighting to preserve the wonderful landscape and natural environment of South Wiltshire, including Stonehenge? How many people in Amesbury would like to object to increased aircraft activity at Boscombe Down, but because the jobs of themselves or their families might be at risk, are unwilling to say so?

When I met the representatives of those taking High Court Action a couple of weeks ago, I suggested that whilst as a priority we should all seek to use the existing democratic structures of County, District and Town and Parish Councils, there is also growing pressure to establish some sort of umbrella organisation which can co-ordinate not just objections, but the mass of current information which is being generated. Furthermore, I suggested that the umbrella organisation, perhaps to be called 'The Boscombe Down Alliance' should also seek sponsorship to create a website carry out a public opinion survey.

I believe that all that we have seen over the past eighteen months or so, and from all the widely differing perspectives and angles, is no less than we would expect from a mature democratic society. Almost all the responses and comments that I have received have reflected a very responsible and restrained approach to a difficult and emotional subject. There are those who wish to retain the military presence at Boscombe Down at almost any cost. There are those who wish to see the end of flying at Boscombe Down at almost any price.

What has happened in our community represents a huge challenge. Not just to us, but to the Government itself. This is an extraordinary situation. It will take extraordinary courage and determination to find the best way forwards. This is not just about a community saying no to the future, "stop the world - I want to get off". This is a very fluid moment in the life of a successful and dynamic community which is proud of its heritage and mindful of its future.

Rob addressing the public meeting on the future of BDN, Amesbury, 1st December 2000.

200 people attended a public meeting in Amesbury on 1st December 2000. The Director of Air Operations at BDN said the aircraft stands would be hydranted if they win. Those present voted 4:1 infavour of BDN remaining a military airfield with some civilian use, 7:1 against BDN becoming a civil airport and 2:1 against closure of the airfield and development for commercial, industrial and residential use

ROBERT KEY MP